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UBER’S WAY OR THE HIGHWAY: HOW PROP 22 CREATED A
NEW WORKER CLASSIFICATION STATUS FOR APP-BASED
DRIVERS AND THE FIGHT FOR GREATER WORKER
PROTECTIONS

Jacqueline Davis*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1944, Supreme Court Justice John Rutledge noted that
“[f]ew problems in the law have given greater variety of
application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the
borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee
relationship and what is clearly one of independent,
entrepreneurial dealing.” 1
Almost eighty years later, that
sentiment continues to ring true. However, Justice Rutledge
could not have anticipated the growing complexity of labor law in
the twenty-first century, spurred by advancements in technology
that make it possible for workers to perform their duties without
ever stepping foot in an office or meeting their supervisors.
Technology platforms such as Uber and DoorDash have started
to dominate delivery and transportation markets previously
occupied by more traditional companies such as taxicab services
and restaurants. According to Uber, about seven million people
in the United States did gig work for either Uber, Lyft, or
DoorDash in 2019. 2 Unfortunately, both state and federal labor
laws have struggled to keep up with the changing landscape of

* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law. I am
grateful to Dean Timothy Glynn for sharing his insights and providing guidance
during the drafting of this Comment. Thank you to the Seton Hall Legislative
Journal members for their helpful suggestions and edits during the publication
process. My deepest gratitude to my parents, Jay and Tammy Davis, for their
endless love, support, and encouragement.
1 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944).
2
Uber, A First Step Toward a New Model for Independent Platform Work,
UBER NEWSROOM (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.uber.com/newsroom/workingtogether-priorities/.
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employment law that has accompanied this shift.
Rideshare services have based their business model on hiring
drivers as independent contractors to avoid state- and federally
Worker
mandated worker protections for employees. 3
classification is important because the vast majority of federal and
state employment law protections only cover employees. 4 While
recognizing that their drivers lack necessary benefits and
protections under independent contractor status, these
companies have consistently resisted attempts to re-classify their
drivers as employees. 5
California attempted to address the needs of the fastgrowing group of gig workers, including rideshare drivers, when
it passed AB 5 in 2019, which would have broadened the
definition of “employee” to include many independent
contractors. 6 However, Uber and other large tech companies
fought back, launching a successful ballot initiative campaign to
exempt themselves from the law.
This Comment surveys the landscape of employment law as
it relates to worker classification. Focusing on California’s failed
attempt to re-classify rideshare drivers as employees, this
Comment argues for a uniform federal approach that expands
worker protections and benefits to a greater share of workers.
Specifically, this Comment advocates for the adoption of the ABC
worker classification test at the federal level through the passage
of the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (the “PRO Act”) and
similar legislation expanding the ABC Test to all federal
employment statutes. At the same time, gig workers seeking
employee status should continue to litigate the issue, arguing that
they are employees, even under the restrictive common law
“right to control” test.

The Editorial Board, Uber Rides Cost More? OK, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/27/opinion/uber-covid-gig-economy.html.
4
TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 5–6 (4th ed.) (2019)
[hereinafter EMPLOYMENT LAW].
5 The Editorial Board, supra note 3.
6 Carolyn Said, AB5, California’s Landmark Gig-Work Law, Takes Effect Jan. 1
Amid Controversy, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/AB5-California-s-landmark-gig-work-law-takes-14942512.php.
3
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Part II of this note examines federal labor law and explains
the various tests employed to determine whether a worker is an
employee or an independent contractor. It then focuses on
California’s attempt to re-classify workers following its supreme
court’s ruling in Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 416
P.3d 1, 10 (Cal. 2018).
Part III analyzes the protections afforded to rideshare
workers under Prop 22 as compared to those under AB 5.
Considering this analysis, Part III argues that congressional
action is needed to provide adequate protection for rideshare
drivers and other similarly situated workers. Specifically, Part III
advocates for the passage of the PRO Act. Lastly, Part III argues
that, even under the common law right to control test, rideshare
drivers could be classified as employees.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYMENT CLASSIFICATION IN
THE UNITED STATES

A. Common Law Right To Control Test
Classifying workers for the purposes of federal statutory
interpretation is difficult because Congress failed to meaningfully
define “employee” or “employer” in many employment law
statutes. 7 In the absence of a meaningful “employee” definition,
the Supreme Court has held that “Congress intended to describe
the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine.” 8 Today, in the majority of
circumstances, both federal and state courts apply some version
of the common law right to control test. 9

7
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 6 (“An ‘employee’ is ‘an individual
employed by an employer.’”).
8
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 6; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 739–40 (1989).
9 EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 30.
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1. Origins of Common Law Test
The distinction between employees and independent
contractors initially arose in the tort liability context to determine
whether “masters” were liable for the acts of their “servants.” 10 In
the early 1700s, English courts “impos[ed] liability on masters for
their servants’ acts regardless of whether the master had given
explicit authority to perform the tort-causing act.” 11 This became
impractical, however, at the start of the nineteenth century, as an
increase in industrial activity led to enormous growth in the
number of individuals hired for a particular skill “with the
expectation that the hiring party would not be responsible for
their conduct.” 12 As a result, English and American courts began
to distinguish between employees and independent contractors
based on the right to control, holding that employers were only
liable for the torts of their employees. 13 The courts reasoned that
this limitation on vicarious liability protected hiring parties who
utilized someone’s services but had no realistic means to
supervise the work. 14 Courts continued to classify workers for
vicarious liability using the right to control test into the midtwentieth century. 15 Under the right to control test, a court was
likely to find an employee-employer relationship when the hiring
party exercised a high degree of control over the worker. 16
In 1933, the Restatement of Agency adopted the right to
control test for purposes of tort liability to third parties. 17 Section
220 defined the term “servant” as “a person employed to
perform service for another in his affairs and who, with respect to
his physical conduct in the performance of the service, is subject
to the other’s control or right to control.” 18 Although this right to
control test was initially used to impose negligence liability on
employers, courts began to use it during the New Deal Era in the
10
Ryan Vacca, Uncertainty in Employee Status Across Federal Law, 92 TEMP.
L. REV. 121, 125 (2019).
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Vacca, supra note 10, at 125.
Restatement (First) of Agency § 220 (Am. L. Inst. 1933).

Id.
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areas of collective bargaining and worker protection. 19
The right to control test continued to be relied upon in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency. 20 Section 220 listed ten factors
to be considered in determining whether a worker is an
employee or independent contractor, including:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement,
the master may exercise over the details of the
work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in
a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or
by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular
business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 21

Vacca, supra note 10, at 127.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (Am. L. Inst. 1958) (“A servant is a
person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect
to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s
control or right to control.”).
19
20

21

Id.
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2. Benefits and Criticisms of the Common Law Test
The chief criticism of the common law test is that its original
purpose was to determine whether the principal was liable for the
worker’s torts “under the doctrine of respondeat superior[.]” 22
The common law test focuses on control because “[t]ort and
agency law seek to link legal accountability with control.” 23 But
federal and state employment statutes “serve different ends.” 24
Many federal labor laws were passed during the New Deal Era
with the goal of compensating for the social inequality resulting
from economic dependency in labor relations. 25 The common
law test fails to recognize this goal. With a focus on the right to
control, “the test denies the benefits of protective social
legislation to many workers who labor under subordinate
economic circumstances.” 26
The common law “test and its variations are highly factintensive[.]” 27 The ten-factor test creates uncertainty regarding
the employer-worker relationship, resulting in “real costs” on
workers and employers, including “ex ante planning and risk
management costs and ex post costs,” such as litigation. 28 While a
more bright-line rule provides “greater predictability,” 29 the
highly fact-sensitive inquiry insulates the common law test from
being either over or underinclusive.

EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 31.
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 31.
24 EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 31.
25
Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A
Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 1 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 153, 168 n.121 (2003) (citing Taco van Peijpe, Independent Contractors
and Protected Workers in Dutch Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 127, 155 (1999).
26 Id. at 168.
27 EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 31.
28 EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 31.
29 EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 31.
22
23
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3. The Common Law Test in Practice
i.

The National
(“NLRA”)

Labor

Relations

Act

Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935. 30 The NLRA protects
the rights of employees to organize themselves into unions and
“encourage[s] collective bargaining by protecting workers’ full
freedom of association.” 31 The Act, however, only protects
“employees” which shall not “include . . . any individual having
the status of an independent contractor[.]” 32 Unfortunately, the
NLRA did not include a helpful definition of “employee,” and
instead provides a circular definition stating that, “the term
‘employee’ shall include any employee[.]” 33 In NLRB v. United
Insurance Co., 34 the Supreme Court stated that the common law
agency test should determine whether a worker is an employee or
independent contractor, 35 emphasizing that “[w]hat is important
is that the total factual context is assessed in light of the pertinent
common-law agency principles.” 36 In 1998, the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) “high-lighted the importance of the
multifactor analysis of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
Section 220[.]” 37 There has been much debate, however, about
the proper application of the common law factors to the
independent contractor analysis. 38
30
31
32
33

National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.

Id.
Id. § 152(3).
Id.

NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254 (1968).
NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (explaining “the obvious
purpose of [the Taft Hartley Amendments] was to have the Board and the courts
apply general agency principles in distinguishing between employees and
independent contractors under the Act.”).
36 Id. at 258.
37 Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 849 (1998).
38
Compare FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir.
2009) [hereinafter FedEx I] (explaining that “while all the considerations at
common law remain in play … an important animating principle by which to
evaluate those factors in cases where some factors cut one way and some the other is
whether the position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in
entrepreneurialism”), with FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 610, 626 (2014)
(rejecting FedEx 1’s emphasis on entrepreneurial opportunity because such
approach “would create a broader exclusion under Section 2(3) of the NLRA”).
34
35
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In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, FedEx sought review of
the NLRB determination that the company “committed an unfair
labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union” 39 and
argued that the drivers were not employees under § 2(3) of the
NLRA. 40 The D.C. Circuit first noted that whether the workers
were independent contractors or employees had jurisdictional
consequences because the NLRB does not have “authority” over
matters concerning independent contractors. 41 The court then
explained, “[t]o determine whether a worker should be classified
as an employee or an independent contractor, the Board and this
court apply the common-law agency test, a requirement that
reflects clear congressional will.” 42
The court, relying on
Corporate Express Delivery Systems, 43 explained that the
common law agency test was qualitative rather than quantitative
and that the evaluation “focus[es] not upon the employer’s
control of the means and manner of the work but instead upon
whether the putative independent contractors ‘have a significant
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’” 44 Shifting the
focus away from the right to control factors to the
entrepreneurial opportunity factors of the Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 220, the court held that the drivers were
independent contractors. 45 Importantly, the court focused on the
theoretical entrepreneurial opportunity rather than the actual
entrepreneurial opportunity. The court was not concerned that
many FedEx drivers chose not to organize their work in the form
of independent business, nor did it take into account that both
the opportunity for profit was minuscule and the company
dictated the routes that the drivers were required to follow. 46 The
FedEx I, 563 F.3d at 495.
Id.
41 Id. at 496.
42 Id. at 495–96 (emphasis added).
43
Id. at 497 n. 3 (citing Corporate Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d
777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Corp. Express, 332 N.L.R.B. at 6)).
44 Id. (stating “[w]e do not just count the factors that favor one camp, and those
39
40

the other, and declare that whichever side scores the most points wins.”) (cleaned
up).
45
Id. at 504 (finding that the drivers had “[t]he ability to operate multiple
routes, hire additional drivers . . . and helpers, and to sell routes without
permission”).
46
Id. at 498 ("even one instance of a driver using such an opportunity can be
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common law test outlined in FedEx makes it especially difficult
for a worker to be considered an employee, as mere
“entrepreneurial potential” will support the conclusion that the
worker is an independent contractor. 47
In 2014, the Labor Board again addressed the issue of
whether FedEx drivers are employees. 48 The NLRB discussed the
relevance of “entrepreneurial opportunity” and made clear that
“entrepreneurial opportunity represents one aspect of a relevant
factor that asks whether the evidence tends to show that the
putative contractor is, in fact, rendering services as part of an
independent business.” 49 The NLRB gave “little weight to the
drivers’ right to sell their routes,” because drivers seldom took
advantage of this opportunity. 50
By looking to actual
entrepreneurial opportunity, rather than theoretical opportunity,
the Board concluded that the FedEx drivers were employees
rather than independent contractors. 51 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit reiterated its previous holding in FedEx I and overturned
the decision of the Board. 52
In 2019, in Supershuttle DFW, Inc., the NLRB expressed
agreement with the FedEx common law agency test. 53 The Board
confirmed that the ten common law factors enumerated in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 determine whether a
worker is an employee. 54 The Board criticized and overruled its
previous ruling in FedEx II, explaining that it “fundamentally
shifted the independent contractor analysis, for implicit policybased reasons, to one of economic realities,” which “greatly
diminishes the significance of entrepreneurial opportunity and
selectively overemphasizes the significance of ‘right to control’
factors relevant to perceived economic dependency.” 55 The
sufficient to show there is no unwritten rule or invisible barrier preventing other
drivers from likewise exercising their contractual right”).
47 See generally FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
48 FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55 (2014).
49 Id. at 11.
50 Id. at 20.
51 Id. at 15.
52 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
53 SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2019).
54 Id. at 4–5.
55 Id. at 33–34.
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Board explained that FedEx I did not make entrepreneurial
opportunity the “overriding consideration,” but rather “an
important animating principle by which to evaluate those
factors.” 56
“Indeed, employer control and entrepreneurial
opportunity are opposite sides of the same coin: in general the
more control, the less scope for entrepreneurial initiative.” 57
In April 2019, the NLRB explicitly addressed the issue of
whether Uber drivers are employees or independent
In an advisory opinion, the NLRB General
contractors. 58
Counsel applied the common law agency test to determine
whether the Uber drivers are independent contractors or
employees. 59 The opinion highlighted the “animating principle”
by which to evaluate the common law factors: whether the
position presents the opportunities and risks inherent in
entrepreneurialism. 60
The opinion stated that “where the
common-law factors, considered together, demonstrate that the
workers in question are afforded significant entrepreneurial
opportunity, the Board will likely find independent-contractor
status.” 61 Considering all of the relevant factors, the NLRB
General Counsel concluded that Uber drivers are independent
contractors and therefore not covered by the NLRA. 62
ii.

Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) and the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)

The IRS employs the common law right to control test for
worker classification. 63 Worker classification is important to the
IRS because the agency is charged with enforcement of wage
withholding. The IRC mostly failed to provide a helpful
definition of “employee,” although some sections explicitly adopt
the common law definition.
For example, 26 U.S.C.
56
57

Id. at 35.
Id. at 42.

58
2019 NLRB Gen. Counsel Advice Memorandum, Uber Technologies Inc.,
13-CA-163062 (April 16, 2019) [hereinafter Uber Advice Memo].
59 Id. at 5–7.
60 Id. at 6–7.
61 Id. at 7 (Quoting SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 NLRB No. 75 (2019) at 11).
62 Id. at 22.
63
Andrew G. Malik, Worker Classification and the Gig-Economy, 69 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1729, 1737 (2017).
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§ 3121(d)(2), which defines terms for purposes of social security
taxes that apply to wages paid to an employee, states that an
employee is “any individual who, under the usual common law
rules applicable in determining the employer-employee
relationship, has the status of employee.” 64 But some sections of
the IRC, such as 26 U.S.C. § 3401, which defines terms for the
purposes of an employer’s federal income tax withholding
obligation, do not adequately define the term “employee.” 65 In
the absence of a clear statutory definition, regulations issued
under § 3401 incorporate the common law test. 66
In 1987, the IRS provided guidance concerning the factors
to be used in determining whether an employment relationship
exists for federal employment tax purposes. 67 The IRS identified
twenty factors to aid the analysis. 68 The agency developed these
factors “based on an examination of cases and rulings” that
considered whether an individual is an employee. 69
Because of the difficulty in applying a twenty-factor test, the
IRS adopted a new approach that groups the factors into
The IRS looks at three relevant categories:
categories. 70
behavioral control, financial control, and the relationship of the
parties. 71 The behavioral control category considers whether the
business retains the right to direct and control how the worker
performs the specific tasks it hired the worker to perform. 72 The
financial control category considers whether a business retains
the right to direct and control how the business aspects of the
worker’s activities are conducted. 73 The relationship of the
26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2).
26 U.S.C. § 3401(c)(“the term ‘employee’ includes an officer, employee, or
elected official of the United States, a State, or any political subdivision thereof”).
66 Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
64
65

67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Id.

70 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR OR EMPLOYEE,
Publication 1779 (Rev. 3-2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1779.pdf.
71
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EMPLOYER’S SUPPLEMENTAL TAX GUIDE,
Publication 15-A Cat. No. 21453T, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf.
72 Id. (showing behavioral control include the training and the type and degree
of instructions the business gives to the worker).
73
Id. (showing financial control include the method of paying the worker; the
worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; and whether the worker has a significant
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parties category includes facts that illustrate how the parties
perceive their relationship, such as facts that show the intent of
the parties in establishing their relationship and whether the
parties are free to terminate their relationship at will. 74 In
addition to the aforementioned factors, “all information that
provides evidence of the degree of control and independence” is
relevant to the worker classification determination. 75
iii.

Social Security Act of 1935 (“SSA”)

The SSA “protect[s] workers from poverty by requiring
employers to pay taxes earmarked for future compensation to
workers during periods of unemployment,” including
retirement. 76 Initially, the SSA provided a very general definition
of “employment” and “employee.” 77 In 1947, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Silk, concluded that “the very
specificity of the exemptions” in the Act, coupled with “the
generality of the employment definitions” indicated that the
terms “employee” and “employment” were to be construed
broadly to accomplish the purposes of the legislation. 78
In response to the apparent broadening of the “employee”
definition in Silk, Congress quickly amended the SSA to exclude
independent contractors. 79 This amendment remains in place
today, and the SSA defines an employee as “any individual who,
under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the
employer-employee relationship, has the status of employee.” 80

investment . . . or provides his services to the relevant market).
74
75
76

Id.

Malik, supra note 63, at 1739.
Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Unmasking the Charade of the Global Supply

Contract: A Novel Theory of Corporate Liability in Human Trafficking and Forced
Labor Cases, 35 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 255, 291 (2013); see also U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S.

704, 710 (1947).
77 Silk, 331 U.S. at 711–12.
78 Id. (adopting the economic realities test under the SSA).
79 Vacca, supra note 10, at 132.
80 42 U.S.C. § 410(j).
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Antidiscrimination Statutes (Title VII,
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act)

Federal antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VII, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), prohibit
discrimination against employees on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, disability, and age. 81 Under Title
VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify
his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 82
Under the ADEA, it is illegal for an employer “to limit, segregate,
or classify his employees in any way which would deprive . . . any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
age.” 83 The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to limit,
segregate, or classify an “employee in a way that adversely affects
the opportunities or status of such . . . employee because of the
disability of such . . . employee.” 84
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA all define the term
“employee” in the same way: “An individual employed by an
employer.” 85 Because all three statutes define “employee” in the
same manner, courts generally analyze worker classification the
same way under each statute. 86 Due to the vague “employee”
definition, however, courts initially “used a variety of approaches
for determining who counted as an employee under the
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)–(3) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (Title VII); 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a)–(b) (ADA).
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
83 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).
84 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1).
85 29 U.S.C. § 630(f); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4).
86
U.S. EEOC v. Glob. Horizons, Inc., 915 F.3d 631 (9th Cir. 2019) (utilizing
common law agency test to define “employee” under Title VII); see Clackamas
Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (utilizing common law
agency test to define “employee” under the ADA); see also Frankel v. Bally, Inc.,
987 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1993) (utilizing common law agency test to define “employee”
under the ADEA).
81
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antidiscrimination statutes.” 87
The Supreme Court finally provided guidance in 2003, in
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells. The Court first
discussed its prior holding in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Darden, that “when Congress has used the term ‘employee’
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as
understood by common-law agency doctrine.” 88 Noting that the
ADA used the term “employee” without a true definition, the
Court concluded that “the common law element of control is the
principal guidepost” that should be followed in ADA cases. 89
Although Clackamas was an ADA case, the Court “clearly
intended” it to apply to all three antidiscrimination acts, given
the similar definition of “employee” in these acts. 90
In
accordance with Clackamas, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which is charged with enforcing Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA, relies on the common law test for
determining who qualifies as an employee. 91
B. The Economic Realities Test
1. Origins of the Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test initially arose in the context of
interpreting several federal labor statutes, including the NLRA
and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). 92 In NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 93 the Supreme Court rejected the common law test
and applied the economic realities test to determine whether
newsboys were employees of a newspaper publisher. 94 In finding
that the newsboys were employees, the Court explained that the
newsboys worked continuously and regularly, relied upon their
Vacca, supra note 10, at 141.
Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden,
503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992)).
89 Id. at 448.
90 Vacca, supra note 10, at 141.
91
2 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL
§§ 605:0008-00010 (2000).
92 Jiyoung Bang, supra note 76, at 284.
93 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 332 U.S. 111 (1944).
94 NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1944).
87
88
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earnings to support themselves, and had their wages largely
influenced by the publishers. 95
Moreover, the publishers
supervised their work hours and provided a substantial portion of
the newsboys’ sales equipment and advertising materials. 96 The
Supreme Court’s adoption of the economic realities test provided
“a greater safety net for workers because the definition of
‘employee’ was expanded to embrace those who were not subject
to direct physical domination,” while “the definition of
‘employer’ was broadened to include those who had no direct
contractual employment relationship with a group of workers.” 97
In response to Hearst, however, Congress amended the
NLRA to “specifically exclud[e] ‘any individual having the status
of an independent contractor’ from the definition of
‘employee.’” 98
This had both the purpose and effect of
overturning Hearst, and it required courts to apply the common
law agency test in determining worker classification under the
NLRA. 99
Although no longer used to determine worker
classification under the NLRA, the economic realities test is still
used today to determine worker classification under the FLSA. 100
Following Hearst, the Supreme Court expanded the
economic realities test to other labor-related statutes. 101 In
United States v. Silk, 102 the Supreme Court sought to determine
whether men who unloaded railway cars were employees of a
railway company under the SSA for the purposes of
unemployment taxes. 103 The Court, under the economic realities
test, concluded that the workers were employees by considering
95
96

Id. at 131.
Id.

97 Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for
Sweatshop Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 327 (2003).
98
99

NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968).

Id.

Jiyoung Bang, supra note 76, at 284–85.
See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (defining
“employee” under provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); U.S. v. Silk, 331
U.S. 704 (1947) (defining “employee” under the Social Security Act).
102 U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
103 Silk, 331 U.S. at 705, superseded by statute, 62 Stat. 438 (1948) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d) (amending SSA to exclude “any individual who,
under the usual common-law rules applicable in determining the employeremployee relationship, has the status of an independent contractor”)).
100
101
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the following five factors: the “degrees of control, opportunities
for profit or loss, investment in facilities, permanency of relation,
and skill required in the claimed independent operation.” 104
Although the first factor, the degree of control, reflects the
common law agency analysis, the remaining four factors seek to
analyze the “broader aspects of a worker’s economic
subordination.” 105
2. Criticisms of the Economic Realities Test
Courts do not consistently apply the economic realities test
outlined in Silk. 106 Some courts abandoned the five factors in
favor of a “totality of the circumstances” test. 107 Other courts
created their own economic realities tests, 108 adding additional
factors. 109 While these additional factors continue to reflect the
spirit of the original five-factor test of Silk, and many courts have
adopted the Silk test, “the uncertainty of which test to use, or the
ability to invent a new test, adds to an already unpredictable
playing field.” 110 Instead, “[c]ourts decide rather arbitrarily which
factors to employ and, without articulated interpretative
frameworks to guide their decisions, courts oscillate between
Id. at 716.
Lung, supra note 97, at 327.
106
Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730 (expanding economic realities test to a totality
of the circumstances); Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F. Supp. 2d 488, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(using a different test to determine economic reality).
107 Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730.
108
Velez, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 499 (citing Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs., 172 F.3d
132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (relevant factors include “whether the allege employer (1)
had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled
employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate
and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records”).
109
Jiyoung Bang, supra note 76, at 295 (The following factors have been
considered under the economic realities test:
(1) the degree of the alleged employer's right to control the
manner in which the work is to be performed; (2) the alleged
employee's opportunity for profit or loss depending upon his
managerial skill; (3) the alleged employee's investment in
equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment
of helpers; (4) whether the service rendered requires a special
skill; (5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship;
(6) and whether the service rendered is an integral part of the
alleged employer's business.
110 Jiyoung Bang, supra note 76, at 295.
104
105
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different versions of the factors, resulting in inconsistencies
within circuits.” 111
At the end of the day, “the economic realities test is similar
to the common-law test both in structure (a multifactored
inquiry) and substance (a focus on control).” 112 Although the
economic realities test should expand the definition of
“employee,” courts have found that the two tests ultimately lead
to the same results. 113
3. Economic Realities Test in Practice
The Department of Labor (“DOL”) oversees the
enforcement of the FLSA. 114 Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938
to ensure safe working conditions and to promote the general
well-being of workers. 115 The FLSA prohibits employers from
failing to pay an employee the federal minimum wage;
discriminating against an employee on the basis of sex by paying
different wages for equal work; and using oppressive child
labor. 116 Similar to other New Deal legislation, the FLSA provides
an unhelpful, circular definition of employee: “the term
‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer.” 117
The FLSA, however, also states that “employ includes to suffer or
permit to work.” 118
The same day that the Supreme Court decided Silk, it also
handed down its decision in Rutherford Food Corp v.
McComb. 119 In Rutherford Food Corp., the Court considered
Lung, supra note 97, at 325.
EMPLOYMENT LAW, supra note 4, at 62.
113
Murray v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010)
("there is no functional difference” between the common law and economic realities
test).
114 Malik, supra note 63, at 1740.
115 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 202; U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
109–10 (1941) (explaining that purpose of Fair Labor Standards Act is to “exclude
from interstate commerce goods produced … under conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standards of living necessary for health and general
well-being”).
116
29 U.S.C. §§ 206 (minimum wage, (d) (prohibition of sex discrimination)),
212 (child labor provisions).
117 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1).
118 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
119 Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947).
111
112
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whether meat boners were employees of a slaughterhouse
company under the FLSA. 120 The Court noted that while the
FLSA’s definition of “employee” is unhelpful, its definition of
“employ” is broad and “comprehensive enough to require its
application to many persons . . . which, prior to this Act, were not
deemed to fall within an employer-employee category.” 121 The
Court reasoned that the determination of the relationship should
not depend on “such isolated factors” under the common law
approach, “but rather upon the circumstances of the whole
activity.” 122
Under this definition of “employ,” the Court
concluded that the meat boners were employees under the
FLSA. 123
Although Congress quickly amended the NLRA and SSA
after Hearst and Silk to define “employee” under the common
law test, they failed to introduce any similar amendment to
change the FLSA after Rutherford. 124 In the absence of an
amendment, the Supreme Court, in Goldberg v. Whitaker House
Cooperative, concluded that the “economic reality” test is the
appropriate standard to determine worker classification under
the FLSA. 125
Today, the DOL continues to rely on the economic realities
test and understands that economic dependence is the “ultimate
inquiry,” and “an employer suffers or permits an individual to
work as an employee if, as a matter of economic reality, the
individual is economically dependent on that employer for
work.” 126 The DOL provides two “core factors” that are most
probative as to whether an individual is an economically
dependent employee. 127 The first core factor is “the nature and
degree of control over the work.” 128 This factor mimics the
common law test and weighs toward the individual being an
independent contractor if the individual “exercises substantial
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 727.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 730.
Id.
Vacca, supra note 10, at 132.

Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961).
29 C.F.R. § 795.105(b) (2019).
29 C.F.R. § 795.105(c-d) (2019).
29 C.F.R. § 795.105(d) (2019).
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control over key aspects of the performance of the work, such as
by setting his or her own schedule, by selecting his or her
projects, and/or through the ability to work for others, which
might include the potential employer’s competitors.” 129
The second core factor is “the individual’s opportunity for
profit or loss.” 130 Where an individual has the “opportunity to
earn profits or incur losses based on his or her exercise of
initiative . . . or management of his or her investment in or
capital expenditure on, for example, helpers or equipment,” this
factor weighs in favor of finding the individual to be an
independent contractor. 131 On the other hand, this factor weighs
in favor of finding that an employment relationship exists when
“the individual is unable to affect his or her earnings or is only
able to do so by working more hours or faster.” 132
If the core factors support different conclusions, the four
remaining factors can provide guidance. Aside from the core
factors, the DOL looks to (1) the amount of skill required; (2) the
degree of permanence of the working relationship between the
individual and the hiring party; (3) “whether the work is part of
an integrated unit of production” and; (4) any additional factors
“relevant in determining whether an individual is an employee or
independent contractor.” 133
C. The ABC Test
1. Origins of the ABC Test
The ABC Test originated in Maine in 1935 but gained
popularity as the dominant reform for state independent
contractor definitions after Massachusetts adopted it in 2004. 134
Although the federal government has not adopted the ABC Test,
it has become increasingly popular among state legislatures and

129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

134
John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent
Contractors and Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common Law
Standard, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 1, 27 (2018).
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courts. 135
While the exact language varies from state to state, the ABC
Test is a simplified version of the common law test that “creates a
rebuttable presumption in favor of employment.” 136 The ABC
Test, as codified in California for the purposes of the
Unemployment Insurance Code and wage orders of the
Industrial Welfare Commission, states that:
a person providing labor or services for
remuneration
shall
be
considered
an
employee
rather
than
an
independent
contractor unless the hiring entity demonstrates
that all of the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) The person is free from the control and
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the
performance of the work, both under the contract
for the performance of the work and in fact.
(B) The person performs work that is outside the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business.
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the
work performed. 137
The first prong, whether the person is free from control,
determines whether the worker is subject “to the type and degree
of control a business typically exercises over employees.” 138 A
business does not need to control the exact manner or details of
the work in order to maintain the requisite control that an
employer ordinarily possesses over its employees (but not
independent contractors) to find an employer-employee
relationship. 139

135

Test”).
136
137
138
139

Id. ("in total, [thirty-eight] states have adopted some form of the ABC
Id.

CAL. LAB. CODE § 2775(b) (West 2021) (emphasis added).
Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 958 (2018).

Id.
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The second prong, whether the worker performs work that is
outside the usual course of the business, “bring[s] within the
‘employee’ category all individuals who can reasonably be viewed
as working ‘in the hiring entity’s business,’ . . . [including] all
individuals who are reasonably viewed as providing services to
the business in a role comparable to that of an employee.” 140
Whether the business labels the worker as an independent
contractor is not controlling. Instead, the focus is on “whether
the work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of an
employee.” 141 A worker is most likely classified as an employee
when their services align with “the usual course of the business of
the entity for which the work is performed and thus who would
ordinarily be viewed by others as working in the hiring entity’s
business.” 142
The third prong, whether the worker is engaged in an
independently established business, ensures that a business is not
attempting to evade its obligations under relevant employment
laws. 143 Evidence that would satisfy this prong includes proof that
the worker has taken steps to incorporate his business, obtain
licenses, or advertise the business. 144 To satisfy the C prong, the
“hiring entity must prove that the worker is customarily engaged
in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business.” 145
Several factors contribute to the ABC Test’s increasing
popularity. First, the ABC Test “creates a presumption of
employment, making it more difficult for unscrupulous
employers to misclassify employees as independent contractors to
avoid legal obligations.” 146 The presumption of employment
places the burden on the employers, who have “the most control
over the facets of the relationship, to prove that” the workers are

140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. at 959.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 962−63.
Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 963.
Id.

146
Karen R. Harned, Georgine M. Kryda, & Elizabeth A. Milito., Creating a
Workable Legal Standard for Defining an Independent Contractor, 4 J. BUS.

ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 102 (2010).
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not employees under the test. 147
A second benefit of the ABC Test is that the three-prong test
eliminates easily manipulated common law factors, such as intent
and location. 148 Instead, the ABC “prongs act as a simple
checklist of objective factors.” 149 Moreover, because failure to
satisfy any single prong results in classifying the worker as an
employee, the ABC Test is “more user-friendly to judges,
workers, and businesses compared to the complexity of current
common law tests.” 150
2. Criticisms of the ABC Test
The ABC Test is not perfect. Despite the seemingly simple
three-prong approach, “the B and C prongs . . . have been
subject to great variation in different jurisdictions’ interpretations
of the test.” 151 Critics have argued that the three prongs “only
hide the other right-to-control factors.” 152 In Carpet Remnant
Warehouse v. New Jersey Dept. of Labor, for example, the New
Jersey Supreme Court looked to several common law right to
control factors to evaluate prong A. 153 Lastly, the ABC Test is
inflexible: there may be situations where the “overwhelming
evidence suggests that a person should” be classified as an
independent contractor, but the failure to satisfy a single prong
requires a finding that the worker is an employee. 154
D. The Adoption of the ABC Test in California
While the federal government determines worker
classification for the purpose of enforcing various federal
employment and labor law statutes, states similarly determine
worker classification to carry out their own laws. In California,
147
148
149
150

Pearce & Silva, supra note 134, at 27.
Id. at 28.

Id.
Id.

151
Alaina Billingham, Driving the Industry Crazy: Classifying Ride-Share
Drivers Following Dynamex, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 189, 198 (2019).
152 Pearce & Silva, supra note 134, at 29.
153

(1991).
154

Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Lab., 125 N.J. 567, 582

Pearce & Silva, supra note 134, at 29.
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the worker classification determination has far-reaching
consequences. Employees, but not independent contractors, are
entitled to state protections including “[state] minimum wage,
workers’ compensation if they are injured on the job,
unemployment insurance, paid sick leave, and paid family
leave.” 155 Given that “California employment law is generally
more worker-friendly than the law of other jurisdictions,”
employers have good reason to prefer independent contractors
over traditional employees. 156
1. Dynamex and its Predecessors
Although worker classification determinations initially arose
in the tort context, “California decisions generally invoked this
common law ‘control of details’ standard beyond the [vicarious
liability] context.” 157
For example, in an unemployment
insurance case, the Supreme Court of California stated that “[t]he
principal test of an employment relationship is whether the
person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the
manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.” 158 Many
decisions also pointed to the Restatement Second of Agency
§ 220 factors to help determine worker classification. 159
In S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial
Relations, the California Supreme Court addressed “whether
agricultural laborers engaged to harvest cucumbers under a
written ‘sharefarmer’ agreement are ‘independent contractors’
[under California] workers’ compensation [statutes].” 160 The
155 See Olson v. California, No. 19-10956-DMG, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34710,
at *14−15 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020).
156
Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the
Degradation of Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 71, 82 (2016)
(California has a high minimum wage, guaranteed paid family leave and paid sick
days, and prevents employers from asking applicants about their salary history); see
Alexia F. Campbell, Here are the States That Treat Workers the Best—and the
Worst, VOX (Aug. 30, 2019) https://www.vox.com/2019/8/30/20838389/best-andworst-states-to-work; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2020).
157 Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 927.
158
Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 943, 944 (1970)
(emphasis added).
159 Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 928.
160
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., 48 Cal. 3d 341, 345
(1989).
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court concluded that “[i]n no practical sense are the
‘sharefarmers’ entrepreneurs operating independent businesses
for their own accounts; they and their families are obvious
members of the broad class to which workers’ compensation
protection is intended to apply.” 161 The court explained that “the
concept of ‘employment’ embodied in the [Workers’
Compensation] Act is not inherently limited by common law
principles,” and “the Act’s definition of the employment
relationship must be construed with particular reference to the
‘history and fundamental purposes’ of the statute.” 162 S.G.
Borello essentially altered the common law test to give
“deference to the purposes of the . . . legislation.” 163
In Martinez v. Combs, the California Supreme Court
addressed the meaning of “employ” and “employer” under the
California wage orders. 164 In Martinez, the strawberry grower,
Munoz & Sons, employed seasonal agricultural workers but failed
to pay them appropriate minimum or overtime wages as required
by the Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order
No. 14. 165 The court observed that the IWC’s “suffer or permit to
work” language had been historically used “to impose liability
upon an entity ‘even when no common law employment
relationship existed.’” 166 The Martinez court emphasized the
importance of not limiting the meaning and scope of
“employment” to only the common law definition for the
purposes of wage orders. 167
In Dynamex, delivery drivers filed a complaint against
Dynamex Operations, a nationwide package and document
delivery company, alleging that Dynamex misclassified them as
independent contractors. 168 This misclassification, the drivers
argued, led to Dynamex’s violation of provisions of the state wage

161
162
163
164
165
166

(2018).
167
168

Id.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 353.

Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 42 (2010).

Id.
Id. at 58; Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 4 Cal. 5th 903, 937
Martinez, 49 Cal. 4th at 65.
Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 914.

DAVIS (DO NOT DELETE)

5/18/2022 4:19 PM

COMMENT

2022]

351

order governing the transportation industry. 169 The wage order
at issue applied to “all persons employed in the transportation
industry whether paid on a time, piece rate, commission, or other
basis.” 170 The wage order defined “employ” as to “engage, suffer,
or permit to work,” and “employee” as “any person employed by
an employer.” 171 Accordingly, the Dynamex court “confine[d] the
discussion . . . to an analysis of the scope and meaning of the
suffer or permit to work standard in California wage orders.” 172
The court explained that the suffer or permit to work
standard was first adopted in the FLSA and was “‘the broadest
definition’ that has been devised for extending the coverage of a
statute or regulation to the widest class of workers.” 173 The suffer
or permit to work standard in California wage orders, the court
explained, “finds its justification in the fundamental purposes
and necessity of the minimum wage and maximum hour
legislation.” 174 Given the historically broad suffer or permit to
work standard, coupled with the remedial goals of the wage
orders, the court concluded that “the suffer or permit to work
standard must be interpreted and applied broadly to include
within the covered ‘employee’ category all individual workers
who can reasonably be viewed as ‘working in the hiring entity’s
business.’” 175
Acknowledging that federal courts use the economic realities
test to determine whether workers are employees under the
“suffer or permit to work” standard of the FLSA, the court
weighed the relative advantages and disadvantages of the test. 176
The court ultimately rejected the economic realities approach for
two reasons. First, the multifactor economic realities test is
unpredictable and “makes it difficult for both hiring businesses
169

Id.

CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090(1) (2021).
171 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090(2) (2021).
172 Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 944.
173 Id. at 951.
174
Id. at 952 ("The basic objective of wage and hour legislation and wage
orders is to ensure that such workers are provided at least the minimal wages and
working conditions that are necessary to enable them to obtain a subsistence
standard of living and to protect the workers’ health and welfare.”).
175 Id. at 953.
176 Id. at 953–54.
170
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and workers to determine in advance how a particular category of
workers will be classified.” 177 Second, the court was concerned
that a multifactor test encourages businesses to manipulate their
workforce into “disparate categories and varying working [ ]
conditions . . . with an eye to the many circumstances that may be
relevant under the” economic realities test. 178
Given the court’s reluctance to adopt the economic realities
test, the court looked to “a simpler, more structured test for
distinguishing between employees and independent contractors:”
the ABC Test, adopted by a number of other jurisdictions. 179 The
court reasoned that the ABC Test minimizes the disadvantages of
the economic realities test because it “presumptively considers all
workers to be employees, and permits workers to be classified as
independent contractors only if the hiring business
demonstrates” each of the three prongs:
(a) that the worker is free from the control and
direction of the hirer in connection with the
performance of the work, both under the contract
for the performance of the work and in
fact; and (b) that the worker performs work that is
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s
business; and (c) that the worker is customarily
engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the work performed. 180
The court explained that because the IWC was enacted before the
FLSA and, therefore, was not intended to embrace the federal
economic realities test of the FLSA, the court was not required to
follow it. 181 The court, in adopting the ABC Test, concluded that
its interpretation of the suffer or permit to work standard “is
faithful to its history and to the fundamental purpose of the wage
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 954.
Dynamex, 4 Cal. 5th at 955.
Id.
Id. at 955–56.
Id. at 956 ("California wage orders are intended to provide broader

protection than that accorded workers under the federal standard”).
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orders and will provide greater clarity and consistency, and less
opportunity for manipulation” than the economic reality or
common law test. 182
2. Codifying Dynamex: AB 5 and Subsequent
Amendments
After the Dynamex decision, California Assemblywoman
Lorena Gonzalez drafted Assembly Bill No. 5 (“AB 5”) to codify
the ABC Test and offer workers “more stability and security and
the opportunity to organize.” 183 In response to this proposed
legislation, representatives from Uber, Lyft, Teamsters Service
Employees International Union, and the governor’s office met to
discuss a deal that “could leave drivers for ride-hailing services
with many of the employment protections under [AB 5] while
allowing them to join a labor organization,” but still exempting
the rideshare drivers from employee classification under AB 5. 184
After negotiations failed, the ridesharing apps attempted to lobby
for the enactment of a separate bill that would have left the
drivers “short of full employee status, but give them a union that
would bargain industrywide with the companies over wages and
benefits.” 185 This attempt also failed. 186
While Dynamex concerned claims asserted by delivery
drivers against a package and document delivery company, 187 AB
5 focused its attention on the gig economy, including rideshare
services. 188 Moreover, although Dynamex only applied to wagehour claims, AB 5 expanded the ABC Test to all California wage
Id. at 964.
ECT, Governor Signs AB 5 to Stop Misclassification and Protect Millions of
Workers, E. CNTY. TODAY (Sept. 18, 2019), https://eastcountytoday.net/governor182
183

signs-ab-5-to-stop-misclassification-and-protect-millions-of-workers/.
184 Kate Conger & Noam Scheiber, California Labor Bill, Near Passage, Is Blow
to Uber and Lyft, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/09/09/business/economy/uber-lyft-california.html.
185
Id. It is unclear, however, if this structure would survive judicial scrutiny
under federal antitrust laws.
186

Id.

Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 903 (2018).
188 Carolyn Said & Dustin Gardiner, Gig-work Bill Passes Senate Committee as
Crowded Rally For and Against it, S.F. CHRON. (July 10, 2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Gig-work-bill-passes-Senate-committeeas-crowds-14085950.php.
187
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orders, the Labor Code, and the Unemployment Insurance
Code. 189 AB 5 was signed into law in late 2019 and took effect
January 1, 2020. 190
AB 5, as codified, states “for purposes of [the Labor Code]
and the Unemployment Insurance Code, and for the purposes of
wage orders in the [IWC],” a worker “providing labor or services
shall be considered an employee” unless the employer
demonstrates each of these conditions is satisfied:
(A) The person is free from the control and
direction of the hiring entity in connection with the
performance of the work, both under the contract
for the performance of the work and in fact.
(B) The person performs work that is outside the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business.
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the
work performed. 191
This language closely mirrors the Dynamex ABC Test, with
no material difference. 192 The significance of the new statute,
therefore, is that it extends the ABC Test to serve as the worker
classification test for the purposes of the Labor Code,
Unemployment Insurance Code, and wage orders in the IWC. 193
Given the broad scope of the “employee” definition under the
ABC Test, AB 5 has the effect of providing more workers with
access to state labor protections such as paid sick leave,
unemployment insurance, and paid family leave. 194
189
Janet Grumer, New California AB 5 Law Expands Independent Contractor
ABC Test, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/

blogs/employment-labor-and-benefits/2019/09/california-ab5-employment-law.
190
Dustin Gardiner, Gov. Newsom Signs AB5, Making Gig-Work Reform Bill
Law, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/GovNewsom-signs-AB5-making-gig-work-reform-14449952.php.
191 CAL. LAB. CODE. § 2775(b)(1) (West 2021).
192 See Dynamex , 4 Cal. 5th at 957 (enumerating the three ABC factors).
193 CAL. LAB. CODE. § 2775(b)(1) (West 2021).
194 CAL. LAB. CODE. § 246 (West 2021) (paid sick leave); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 621 (West 2021) (unemployment insurance); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3302 (West
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Implementation of the new statute, however, did not go off
without a hitch. A number of amendments have since been
added to carve out exceptions for workers in various industries. 195
According to the amendments, workers that are subject to the
economic realities test rather than the ABC Test include
business-to-business contracting relationships, contracts between
a referral agency and a service provider, contracts for
professional services, occupations in connection with the
creation, marketing, promotion, or distribution of sound
recordings or musical compositions, some medical professionals,
and commercial fishermen. 196 Rideshare services, however, did
not receive an exemption from the state legislature. 197
3. Proposition 22
After the California Legislature enacted AB 5, Uber and Lyft
successfully launched a 2020 state ballot initiative to exempt their
drivers from the new law. 198 The ballot initiative, Proposition 22
(“Prop 22”), exempts “app-based transportation and delivery
companies from providing employee benefits to certain
drivers.” 199
It assumes that the drivers are independent
contractors unless:
(a) the network company does not unilaterally
prescribe specific dates, times of day, or minimum
hours during which the app-based driver must be
logged into the network company’s [app]. (b) The
network company does not require the app-based
driver to accept any specific rideshare service or
delivery service request as a condition of
2021) (paid family leave).
195
Dorothy Atkins, California Legislation and Regulation to Watch in 2021,
LAW360 (January 3, 2021).
196 Cal. Lab. Code § 2783 (West 2021).
197

Id.

Kate Conger & Noam Scheiber, California Labor Bill, Near Passage, Is Blow
to Uber and Lyft, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
198

2019/09/09/business/economy/uber-lyft-california.html.
199
OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, https://web.archive.org/web/
20210429214531/https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/22/title-summary.htm
(last visited Jan. 29, 2021) [hereinafter OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE].
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maintaining access to the network company’s
[app]. (c) The network company does not restrict
the app-based driver from performing rideshare
services or delivery services through other network
companies except during engaged time. [and] (d)
The network company does not restrict the appbased driver from working in any other lawful
occupation or business. 200
Although effectively precluding drivers from being
considered as “employees” under California law, Prop 22
provides some benefits to the drivers, including minimum wage
guarantees, healthcare subsidies, and occupational accident
insurance. 201 Prop 22 guarantees drivers earn at least one
hundred and twenty percent of local minimum wage plus thirty
cents per mile, calculated by “engaged time,” or time spent en
route to, or during, a ride. 202 Drivers earning more than the
guaranteed minimum can also keep all of their earnings, as well
as one hundred percent of their tips. 203
In addition to a guaranteed minimum wage, drivers receive a
healthcare contribution “equal to [one hundred] percent of the
average employer payment under the Affordable Care Act if they
work [twenty-five] hours per week,” 204 and equal to fifty percent if
they work at least fifteen hours per week. 205 But both the
healthcare subsidy and the guaranteed minimum wage are only
based on “engaged time.” 206 The time between trips does not
count, which means that it is likely that most drivers make less
than local minimum wages for their total time using the app, and

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7451 (West 2021).
OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 199.
202
Faiz Siddiqui, Uber, Other Gig Companies Spend Nearly $200 Million to
Knock Down an Employment Law They Don’t Like—and It Might Work, WASH.
POST, (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/10/09/
prop22-uber-doordash/.
203
Kim Lyons, Uber and Lyft Roll Out New Benefits For California Drivers
Under Prop 22, THE VERGE (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/
12/14/22174600/uber-lyft-new-benefits-california-drivers-prop-22-gig-economy.
204 Siddiqui, supra note 202.
205 Lyons, supra note 203.
206 Siddiqui, supra note 202.
200
201
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they do not receive a guaranteed rate of pay. 207 Drivers spend an
estimated thirty to forty percent of their time clocked into the
app waiting for passengers, 208 which means that it takes
approximately thirty-eight hours to reach twenty-five hours of
“active” time for full healthcare benefits. 209 Similarly, even if the
driver works thirty-eight hours, he or she is only guaranteed the
minimum wage for the roughly twenty-five hours of active time,
receiving nothing for the other thirteen hours of inactive time. 210
Rideshare services invested over $224 million into the Prop
22 campaign. 211 In comparison, opponents only raised about $20
million. 212 Uber and Lyft paid for advertisements on cable,
“social media[,] and their own apps with messaging promising a
minimum wage, health care[,] and protections typically consistent
with” full-time employees. 213 For example, one click-through
prompt on Uber explained that “Prop 22 will provide
guaranteed earnings and a health care stipend,” and gave drivers
the option to tap “Yes on Prop 22” or “okay.” 214
The
advertisements showed drivers embracing the independence and
earnings opportunities gig work provided, and asked California
207
Eve Batey, California Voters Approve Tech-Bankrolled Campaign to Deny
Benefits to Food Delivery Drivers , EATER S.F. (Nov. 4, 2020), https://sf.eater.com/

2020/11/4/21549219/prop-22-food-delivery-uber-postmates-lyft-DoorDash-2020election.
208 Emily Brill, 3 Open Benefits Questions Under CA’s Prop 22 , LAW360
(November 13, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1328718/3-open-benefitsquestions-under-california-s-prop-22.
209 If one-third (thirty-three percent) of the total time is spent waiting for
passengers, forty minutes of each hour is “active.” Forty minutes (of active time)
multiplied by thirty-eight (total hours) is 1,520 minutes, or twenty-five hours and
twenty minutes (of active time).
210 See Batey, supra note 207 (explaining that requirement to pay drivers 120
percent of local or statewide minimum wage only applies to active time); Emily
Brill, 3 Open Benefits Questions Under CA’s Prop 22 , LAW360 (November 13,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1328718/3-open-benefits-questions-undercalifornia-s-prop-22 (explaining that drivers spend 30 to 40 percent of their time
clocked into the app waiting for passengers).
211 Batey, supra note 207.
212 Batey, supra note 207.
213 Faiz Siddiqui & Nitasha Tiku, Uber and Lyft Used Sneaky Tactics To Avoid

Making Drivers Employees in California, Voters Say. Now, They’re Going
National., WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/11/17/uber-lyft-prop22-misinformation/.
214

Id.
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voters to not take away driver flexibility. 215
As part of the Yes Campaign, Uber and Lyft warned that
they would either hike up prices or leave California if they were
forced to re-classify their drivers as employees instead of
independent contractors. 216 “Voters were told that they could
grant drivers guaranteed earnings and health-care benefits by
voting ‘yes,’ but if they voted ‘no,’ up to [ninety] percent of
gig[]work driving jobs could disappear.” 217
Since its passage, some voters have expressed remorse over
their Prop 22 vote, explaining that they were deceived by the Yes
Campaign. 218 The rideshare services cautioned that a “no” vote
would subject drivers to greater control by the company,
including set hours and schedules. 219 Some voters believed that
“Prop 22 was going to help the drivers, and Uber and Lyft were
going to be paying them more.” 220 A survey of California voters
revealed that at least “[forty] percent of ‘yes’ voters thought they
were supporting gig workers’ ability to earn a living wage.” 221
Some voters did not make the connection between AB 5 and
Prop 22 and thought that they were simply granting minimum
wage to the drivers. 222 Moreover, some voters did not realize that
“they were making a choice between benefits guaranteed through
employment and an arbitrary set of supplemental benefits—
including a health-care stipend—designed by the gig
companies.” 223 Although some advertisements cited a survey that
“claimed that at least 70 percent of drivers supported Prop 22[,]
215

Id.

Eve Batey, That Price Hike Delivery Apps Threatened If Prop 22 Failed?
It’s Happening Anyway, EATER S.F. (Dec. 15, 2020, 10:47 AM PST),
216

https://sf.eater.com/2020/12/15/22176413/uber-eats-DoorDash-price-hike-feedecember-prop-22.
217 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.
218 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.

219
Uber, Lyft-Backed State Ballot Measure Passes; Gig Economy Business
Model Remains Intact; Drivers Independent Contractors, CBS NEWS BAY AREA

(Nov. 4, 2020, 5:01 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/11/04/cuber-lyftbacked-state-ballot-measure-passes-gig-economy-business-model-remains-intactdrivers-remain-independent-contractors/.
220 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.
221 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.
222 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.
223 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.
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[t]he data cited included unscientific surveys and a poll ordered
by Uber.”224
III.

PROP 22 AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR RIDESHARE
DRIVERS

A. Prop 22 Provides Drivers with Fewer Protections than

Traditional Employees Despite Rideshare Services
Exercising Typical Employer Control Over Them

1. Prop 22 Fails to Provide Drivers With Sufficient
Worker Protections
Prop 22 is a potential “third way” to classify workers that fall
somewhere between independent contractor and employee. 225
“Prop 22 offers workers more benefits” and protections than
independent contractors typically receive but falls short of
“offering the benefits typically provided to employees.” 226
Although Prop 22 provides drivers with a guaranteed minimum
wage, a healthcare subsidy, and occupational accident
insurance, 227 it does not provide full, traditional employee
protections and benefits. For example, under AB 5, employees
are protected by the IWC, which sets “meal and rest break
requirements, minimum wage, and overtime pay for
employees.” 228 Moreover, California employees are protected by
the Labor Code, which provides remedies to workers for injuries
suffered in connection with their employment, including access
to workers’ compensation insurance. 229
At first glance, the guaranteed minimum wage equal to 120
percent of the local minimum wage seems to provide drivers with
a comfortable hourly rate. Lyft CEO John Zimmer explained
Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 213.
Axios Re:Cap, Lyft co-founder John Zimmer on what comes next for the gig
economy, AXIOS, 05:50 (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.axios.com/lyft-john-zimmerprop-22-worker-0db82847-b7e2-4963-938c-60e47927d7f5.html.
226 Brill, supra note 208.
227
Text of Proposed Laws, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, at 30,
https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/general/pdf/topl.pdf (California General Election,
Tuesday, November 3, 2020).
228
Leticia Chavez, The Dynamex Dichotomy and the Path Forward, 50
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 147, 152 (2020).
229 Id. at 153.
224
225
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that the rate is set above the local minimum wage to account for
the unengaged time spent on the app. 230 In 2021, the guaranteed
minimum wage for Uber was $15.60, “when the California
minimum wage [was] $13.00.” 231
While a $15.60 minimum wage sounds promising, a
University of California, Berkeley Labor Center study found that
“[a]fter considering multiple loopholes in the initiative . . . the
pay guarantee for Uber and Lyft drivers is actually the equivalent
of a wage of $5.64 per hour.” 232 The study found that engaged
time amounted to only sixty-seven percent of the drivers’
working time, and companies did not pay for approximately
thirty-three percent of the time that drivers were waiting,
although such time was a necessary part of the drivers’ work. 233
For comparison, not paying for unengaged time is like paying a
grocery cashier only when a customer is at the counter. 234
Drivers are also not reimbursed for the costs of driving while
waiting for a ride. 235 While waiting for a ride, drivers will spend
time driving, heading back from a drop-off area to an area where
they are more likely to have a pick-up, or circling in downtown
areas where there is no place to park. 236 None of the costs
associated with driving while waiting, including gas and wear and
tear on the vehicle, can be covered as reimbursed employee
expenses. 237
Prop 22 guarantees drivers a health care stipend if they
average at least fifteen active weekly hours per quarter. 238 Drivers
averaging between fifteen and twenty-five hours during a
quarterly period “receive a stipend equivalent to [forty-one]
Axios Re:Cap, supra note 225.
Ken Jacobs & Michael Reich, The Uber/Lyft Ballot Initiative Guarantees
only $5.64 an Hour, U.C. BERKELEY LAB. CTR. (Oct. 31, 2019),
https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/the-uber-lyft-ballot-initiative-guarantees-only-5-64an-hour-2/.
230
231

232
233
234
235
236

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
Carolyn Said, Instacart Is Raising Prices To Help Pay For Prop. 22, S.F.
CHRON. (February 19, 2021), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Instacartis-raising-prices-for-its-California-15961886.php.
237
238
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percent of the average premium for a covered California Bronze
plan.” 239 Drivers who average at least twenty-five engaged hours
receive a stipend “equal to [eighty-two] percent of the average
premium for a covered California Bronze plan.” 240 App-based
companies calculate the stipend by looking at “the statewide
average monthly premium of bronze-level plans sold on the
Covered California exchange.” 241
Although the healthcare
stipend is a new benefit for rideshare drivers, it bears very little
resemblance to a typical employer-based healthcare benefit, 242
and the vast majority of drivers do not qualify because drivers
must work fifteen hours of engaged time for a single company to
receive any stipend. 243 For example, a driver that worked an
average of twenty-two hours per week for Uber and fourteen
hours per week for Lyft would only qualify for a forty-one percent
stipend from Uber, despite averaging thirty-four engaged hours
per week for the rideshare services. Importantly, the healthcare
stipend would require drivers to “periodically reassess what kind
of coverage they would qualify for and could afford” because the
stipends are calculated and distributed quarterly. 244
Although Prop 22 requires companies to provide some
occupational accident insurance, the requirement is at levels “well
below the protections required by California’s laws for
employees.” 245 The insurance payment is based on “the driver’s
earnings from all app-based companies the driver works for.” 246
The occupational accident insurance, however, is not available to
Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
241
Rachel Bluth, App-based Companies Pushing Prop. 22 Say Divers Will Get
Health Benefits. Will They?, POLITIFACT (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/
factchecks/2020/oct/28/lyft-lyft/app-based-companies-pushing-prop-22-say-driverswi/.
242 California Healthline, Fact Check: App-Based Companies Pushing Prop. 22
Say Drivers Will Get Health Benefits. Will They? LAIST (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://laist.com/2020/10/29/app-based_companies_pushing_prop_22_say_drivers
_will_get_health_benefits_will_they.php.
243 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
244 California Healthline, supra note 242.
245 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
246
Rebekah Didlake, The Gig Economy’s Battleground—California
Proposition 22, GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. BLOG (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://ggulawreview.com/2020/09/22/the-gig-economys-battleground-californiaproposition-22/.
239
240
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drivers who are injured while logged onto multiple apps. 247
Given that drivers are often signed into multiple apps
simultaneously (to minimize “waiting time”), there is a strong
likelihood that a driver who is injured while waiting for a ride
would not be eligible for the accident insurance. 248
One of the biggest consequences of classifying rideshare
drivers as independent contractors is that it shifts the burden of
payroll taxes onto the drivers. 249 Although California cannot alter
how workers are classified for federal payroll tax purposes, it is
important to recognize this tax burden considering the driver’s
purported increased minimum wage guarantee. Additionally,
independent contractor status prevents drivers from enjoying
paid rest breaks, paid sick leave, and unemployment insurance. 250
Therefore, the increased minimum wage is deceiving given the
lost employee benefits and protections and lack of compensation
for waiting times.
Perhaps the most unsettling component of Prop 22 is its
permanency in California. In addition to rolling back the
standards in AB 5, it precludes local governments “from enacting
their own higher labor standards” and prevents localities from
setting standards to “govern compensation, scheduling, leave,
healthcare, and termination of an app-based driver’s contract.” 251
Additionally, the legislature must secure a seven-eighths
supermajority to amend the law. 252 A supermajority is rare, as
California propositions typically include language requiring a
two-thirds majority for the legislature to amend, but the Prop 22
seven-eighths supermajority requirement ensures that the law is
essentially unchangeable. 253 This unusually high requirement has
247
248

Id.
Proposition 22: Analyzing the Impact on App-Based Drivers’ Earnings, U.C.

RIVERSIDE SCH. OF BUS. CTR. FOR ECON. FORECASTING & DEV. (2020),
https://ucreconomicforecast.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/Prop22_Driver_Earnings_Analysis_August2020.pdf (“Lyft
found that 55% of its drivers worked on at least one other app-based driving
platform. The Cornell study of Seattle found that a third of driver time is spent
signed into Lyft and Uber apps simultaneously.”).
249 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
250 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
251 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
252 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
253
Lizette Chapman, California’s Prop 22 Would be Virtually Permanent if It
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the practical effect of requiring any future changes to be enacted
by another ballot initiative. 254 A group of app-based drivers,
along with the Service Employees International Union, filed an
emergency petition for writ of mandate with the California
Supreme Court. 255 The petition asked the Court to find Prop 22
invalid and unenforceable because the seven-eighths
supermajority requirement is a usurpation of the constitutional
“authority of the Legislature.” 256 The Court denied the petition
and stated that the suit could be refiled in a lower court. 257 The
plaintiffs refiled a near-identical petition for writ of mandate in
the Superior Court in February 2021. 258 The Superior Court, by
order dated August 20, 2021, found that Prop 22 is
unconstitutional because (1) it limits the power of a future
legislature to define app-based drivers as workers subject to
worker compensation law and (2) it defines unrelated legislation
as an “amendment” and is not germane to Prop 22’s stated
“theme, purpose, or subject.” 259 The court further held that the
entirety of Prop 22 is unenforceable because the unconstitutional
provisions are not severable. 260 The Superior Court’s ruling is
currently on appeal at the time of this Comment’s publication. 261
Uber and Lyft’s threats that employee classification would
require the companies to create driver schedules and layoff
workers misled both drivers and voters. 262 Nothing in the law
Passes, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 20, 2020) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/

newsletters/2020-10-20/california-s-prop-22-would-be-virtually-permanent-if-itpasses.
254 Jacobs & Reich, supra note 231.
255
Emergency Pet. for Writ of Mandate and Request for Expedited Review,
Castellanos v. State of California, No. S266551 (Cal. 2021).
256 Id. at 10.
257
Carolyn Said, Union-Backed Prop. 22 Challenge Rejected by California
Supreme Court, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/Union-backed-Prop-22-challenge-rejected-by-15922771.php.
258
Tim Ryan, Union, Drivers Say Calif. Prop 22 is Unconstitutional, LAW360
(Feb. 12, 2021); See also Verified Pet. for Writ of Mandate, Castellanos v. State of
California, No. S266551 (Cal. Super. 2021).
259
Castellanos v. State, No. RG21088725, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 7285, at
*17–18 (Cal. Super. Aug. 20, 2021).
260

Id.

Maeve Allsup, Prop. 22 Backers Appeal Ruling Striking California Gig
Work Law, BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 23, 2021).
262
Faiz Siddiqui & Nitasha Tiku, California Voters Sided with Uber, Denying
261
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prevented companies from allowing employees to work flexible
schedules, 263 and the companies already comply with New York
City’s higher labor standards. 264
2. Rideshare Services Exercise Employer Control
Over Drivers While Denying the Existence of an
Employer-Employee Relationship
Despite rideshare services’ claims that their drivers enjoy
flexibility and autonomy, research shows that Uber’s drivers are
Rather than
“in fact tightly surveilled and controlled.” 265
reporting directly to a supervisor, Uber’s drivers are at the mercy
of an algorithm. 266 The algorithm tracks personalized statistics,
including “ride acceptance rates, cancellation rates, hours spent
logged into the app and trips completed.” 267 Uber provides safe
driving reports by using data from the drivers’ accelerometer,
GPS, and gyroscope. 268
Further, in-app notifications, heat
maps[,] and emails with real-time and predictive information
encourage drivers to relocate to surge pricing areas. 269 When a
driver attempts to log out, they are prompted with an automatic
message stating “your next rider is going to be awesome! Stay
online to meet him.” 270

Drivers Benefits by Classifying Them as Contractors, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/03/uber-prop22-resultscalifornia/.
263 The Editorial Board, California, Reject Prop 22, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/opinion/california-prop-22-uber-lyft.html.
264 Siddiqui & Tiku, supra note 262.
265 Edward Ongweso Jr., Uber Will ‘Shut Down’ in California if it Must Classify
Drivers as Employees, VICE (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
n7wkdm/uber-will-shut-down-in-california-if-it-must-classify-drivers-as-employees.
For a more in-depth discussion of how Uber uses psychological tricks to influence
drivers, see Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push its
Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html.
266
Alex Rosenblat, When Your Boss is an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/opinion/sunday/uber-driver-life.html.
267
268
269
270

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Uber has a long history of controlling many aspects of its
drivers’ experiences. 271 Drivers are unable to expand revenues
because they cannot control prices, alter Uber’s commission, or
expand their customer base; they can only drive more hours. 272
They also have little control over their customer base because
they are penalized for rejecting trips. 273 Furthermore, drivers are
even penalized for picking inefficient routes. 274 Given that
rideshare drivers have very little flexibility beyond choosing when
to log on to work (both before and after the passage of Prop 22),
it is unclear how Prop 22 preserved any real flexibility for drivers.
3. Prop 22 Will Have Far-Reaching Consequences
Outside California and Beyond the Rideshare
Service Industry
California is one of the most worker-friendly states in the
country. 275 Despite this, California rideshare drivers still lost the
fight over worker classification against rideshare companies. The
rideshare companies prevailed by using “a deluge of money to
convince voters that the proposition served workers’ interests by
preserving their flexibility, ensuring a guaranteed level of pay,
and providing them with ‘portable’ benefits.” 276 Given its success
in California, Uber and other rideshare platforms are planning
to replicate the Prop 22 campaign across the United States,
including in Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania. 277 Uber has already created a campaign, “IC+,”
which stands for “independent contractor plus,” a nod to the tech
company’s goal of creating a third classification of workers. 278
271
Lawrence Mishel & Celine McNicholas, Uber Drivers Are Not
Entrepreneurs, 9 ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 20, 2019).
272 Id. at 1.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275
Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Here are the States That Treat Workers the
Best—and the Worst, VOX (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/8/30/

20838389/best-and-worst-states-to-work.
276
Terri Gerstein, What Happened in California is a Cautionary Tale for Us
All, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/opinion/prop22-california-gig-workers.html.
277

Id.

Edward Ongweso Jr., What Is 'IC+', Uber's New Plan to Warp Labor Laws
Nationwide, VICE (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/akdvpa/what-is-ic278
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Tech executives like Uber chief executive Dara Khosrowshahi are
confident that the “IC+” model will win. 279
Less than a month after Prop 22 went into effect, a
California grocery chain, Albertsons, laid off delivery driver
Other
employees and replaced them with gig workers. 280
industries could face a similar consequence because “if you create
a subcategory that has fewer rights and wages, [you are] going to
shift from traditional employment to this new category of
work.” 281 Albertsons was unable to fire a number of union
delivery drivers whose jobs were insulated by a contract. 282
The labor protection disparity between the Albertsons union
drivers and gig workers is stark. The union drivers earn between
“$17 to $22 an hour, have access to employer-paid health
insurance, vacation time, sick time and 401(k) benefits, and do
not have to use and maintain their own vehicles for their work.” 283
Meanwhile, the gig workers earn wages only for engaged time
and are “eligible for some health insurance subsidies” when they
work fifteen hours or more per week. 284 These gig workers are
also “not entitled to . . . overtime rules, workers’ compensation
. . . and unemployment insurance.” 285 It is unsurprising that
businesses such as Albertsons are drawn to the Prop 22 business
model, as it allows them to “‘lower labor costs’” and avoid
compliance
with
“‘basic
workplace
standards
and
responsibilities.’” 286

ubers-new-plan-to-warp-labor-laws-nationwide.
279

Id.

Eli Rosenberg, Albertsons is Laying Off Employees and Replacing Them
with Gig Workers, as App Platforms Rise, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2021),
280

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/06/vons-albertsons-doordashprop-22-layoffs/.
281
282
283
284
285
286

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting David Weil, current professor at Brandeis University and

former Labor Department official).
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Other industries are also eyeing the Prop 22 staffing
structure. 287 Shawn Carolan, a venture capitalist and early Uber
investor, has explained that “the existence of flexible work
arrangements in fields like nursing, executive assistance,
tutoring, programming, restaurant work and design suggests that
a Prop 22 inspired approach could make sense there as well.” 288
Carolan would expand the Prop 22 model to “basically any
industry where an ongoing relationship with a single employer [is
not] essential to do the job well.” 289 The traditional employeremployee model is preferable where “the continuity of
relationship” and “specific training” are important to “the core
value” of the position. 290 On the other hand, a Prop 22 model is
preferable where workers can “move frictionlessly between
platforms.” 291
Carolan sees Prop 22 benefits such as the
healthcare stipend to be an essential part (rather than a bug) of
the system because it allows the subsidy to “move[]” with the
worker between employers, while traditional employer-sponsored
healthcare often ends upon termination of the employment
relationship. 292
B. The Path Forward for Rideshare Drivers: The PRO Act
Both President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris
opposed Prop 22. In fact, President Biden’s official campaign
site include[d] “a promise to create a federal version of
California’s [AB 5].” 293 Importantly, President Biden wants to
287
Edward Ongweso Jr, What is ‘IC+’, Uber’s New Plan to Warp Labor Laws
Nationwide?, VICE (Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.vice.com/en/article/akdvpa/what-is-

ic-ubers-new-plan-to-warp-labor-laws-nationwide.
288 Shawn Carolan, What Proposition 22 Now Makes Possible, THE INFO. (Nov.
10, 2020), https://www.theinformation.com/articles/what-proposition-22-now-makespossible.
289
290
291

Id.
Id.
Id. (Carolan imagines applying the Prop 22 model to the following

industries: agriculture, zookeeping, nursing, executive assistance, tutoring,
programming, restaurant work and design).
292
Id. (Carolan does acknowledge that the subsidy is only calculated based on
time spent on a single app rather than the cumulative time spent on all apps
combined: “A remaining improvement would be if the threshold to receive these
benefits were [sic] calculated across app companies”).
293
Kari Paul, Prop 22: Why Uber’s Victory in California Could Harm Gig
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establish “a federal standard modeled on the ABC Test for all
labor, employment, and tax laws.” 294 President Biden has vowed
to adopt the ABC Test because the current tests give “too much
discretion to employers . . . and too little discretion to
government agencies and courts.” 295 To that end, President
Biden has committed to supporting the PRO Act, which amends
the NLRA by adopting the “ABC” Test to classify workers as
employees or independent contractors. 296 Specifically, the PRO
Act amends Section 2(3) of the NLRA by adding that:
[A]n individual performing any service shall be
considered an employee . . . and not an
independent contractor, unless–
(A) the individual is free from control and
direction in connection with the performance of
the service, both under the contract for the
performance of service and in fact;
(B) the service is performed outside the usual
course of the business of the employer; and
(C) the individual is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the service performed. 297
The ability to unionize and engage in collective bargaining
under the NLRA would have immediate, tangible benefits for
rideshare drivers. For example, unions have a strong track

Workers Nationwide, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com
/us-news/2020/nov/11/california-proposition-22-uber-lyft-DoorDash-labor-laws.
The Biden Plan for Strengthening Worker Organizing, Collective
Bargaining, and Unions, https://joebiden.com/empowerworkers/ (last visited Feb. 6,
294

2022) (emphasis added).
295 Biden Plan, supra note 294.
296
Jay Cohen et al., Transition to a Biden Administration: Recent
Developments and the Continuing Debate Concerning Worker Classification, PAUL
WEISS (Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/employment/
publications/transition-to-a-biden-administration-recent-developments-and-thecontinuing-debate-concerning-worker-classification?id=38991; see also H.R. 842,
117th Congress (2021).
297 H.R. 842 § 101(b), 117th Congress (2021).
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record of raising wages for their members. 298 Unionized workers’
earnings “exceed those of comparable nonunion workers by
about fifteen percent, a phenomenon known as the ‘union wage
premium.’” 299 Rideshare workers, in particular, could benefit
from strong union representation in wage negotiations. Prop 22
guaranteed rideshare drivers a minimum wage equal to 120
percent of the local minimum wage; 300 however, the drivers are
not paid for unengaged time, which equates to roughly thirty
percent of the drivers’ time spent logged on to the app. 301 Given
the historic success of union wage negotiations, it is not
unreasonable to believe that union representatives could have
negotiated a better wage schedule than what Prop 22 affords.
In addition to wage negotiations, unions can negotiate
benefits on behalf of their members. Given that rideshare drivers
are currently recognized as independent contractors under
federal law and most state laws, they have few, if any, benefits or
protections, such as health insurance or paid leave. A strong
union would create the opportunity to negotiate with the
employer to obtain traditional employee benefits for their
members. When compared to nonunion workers, unionized
employees “are given employer-provided health and pension
benefits far more frequently” and “are provided better paid leave
and better health and pension plans.” 302 Prop 22 provides a
healthcare subsidy and accidental insurance; however, as
previously discussed, these benefits are substandard compared to
typical employer-provided benefits. 303 It is entirely plausible that
a strong union would negotiate better benefits for drivers.
The PRO Act’s passage would be a strong first step toward
providing better protections for rideshare drivers and other
similarly situated independent contractors. The PRO Act is
limited, however, because it merely adopts the ABC Test to
define “employee” under the NLRA and leaves in place the
common law and economic realities tests to define “employee”
298 Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, How Unions Help All Workers, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (Aug. 2003), https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/.
299 Id. (quoting research findings).
300 OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 199.
301 Siddiqui, supra note 202.
302 Mishel & Walters, supra note 298.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 220–43.
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under every other federal labor and employment law statute. 304
While an effective union could theoretically advocate for parallel
labor protections through contract negotiations, rideshare
drivers would still not be able to bring a cause of action under
federal labor laws such as the FLSA or ADA. Moreover, both
workers and companies will face confusion from analyzing worker
classification under different tests for different statutes. For
example, a rideshare driver could enjoy the benefits of belonging
to a union as an employee but could still be required to pay
payroll taxes as an independent contractor under the IRS
common law test. 305
Because the law seeks to promote
predictability, and employment and labor laws generally seek to
provide protection to the greatest number of workers, Congress
should take the PRO Act a step further and redefine “employee”
under all federal labor and employment statutes to accord with
the ABC Test. 306
C. Litigating Employee Status
Although the PRO Act was recently approved in the House
of Representatives, it may be dead on arrival in the Senate. 307
With only a narrow Democratic majority, Republicans have
vowed to filibuster the bill, which could only be overcome by sixty
votes. 308 Even in the absence of a filibuster threat, it is unclear if
the bill would even have enough support from Democratic
senators to overcome Republican opposition to the bill. 309 Given
that the PRO Act is far from a sure thing, rideshare drivers
seeking greater labor protections may be forced to continue
litigating the issue in the courts. There is a strong case, however,
that rideshare drivers could be considered employees under the
stricter, more traditional tests.
H.R. 842 § 101(b), 117th Congress (2021) (amending the NLRA only).
26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2).
306 Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law, Prized Yet Not Promoted:
A Study in Judicial Priorities, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 48, 51 (2015).
307
Nicholas Fandos, House Passes Labor Rights Expansion, but Senate
Chances Are Slim, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/
us/politics/house-labor-rights-bill.html.
304
305

308

Id.

Ryan Grim, Sen. Mark Kelly is Emerging as an Obstacle to the PRO Act,
THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 12, 2021).
309
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The NLRB previously argued, perhaps erroneously, that
under the common law test, rideshare drivers are independent
contractors, not employees. 310 There is a strong argument to be
made, however, that rideshare drivers are indeed employees
under the common law definition.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency lists ten factors that
should be considered to determine worker classification,
including:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement,
the master may exercise over the details of the
work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in
a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done
under the direction of the employer or by a
specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or
by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular
business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 311
Analyzing these ten factors, it is not implausible for a court to
conclude that a rideshare driver is in fact an employee.

310
311

Uber Advice Memo , supra note 58.

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (Am. L. Inst. 1958).
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Uber, through its algorithm, exercises a high degree of
control over its drivers. 312 Uber does not allow its drivers to view
the destination or fare information before accepting a trip, and
Uber punishes drivers (by suspension or removal) for cancelling
unprofitable fares. 313 Uber’s blind acceptance policy is made
riskier for drivers because Uber, not the drivers, set a low
minimum fare rate. 314 For example, if a driver accepts a fivedollar minimum fare ride, they will receive $3.20 after Uber
collects a one-dollar safe ride fee and twenty percent commission
of the remaining four dollars. 315 The blind acceptance and faresetting policies suggest that the rideshare company exercises a
high degree of control over their drivers, and quashes the notion
that drivers are entrepreneurs.
Uber has argued that under the common law right to control
test, their drivers are not employees because drivers can choose
to work as much or as little as they like and are never required to
accept any “leads” generated by Uber. 316 However, the Uber
Driver Handbook states that the company expects drivers to
accept all ride requests, and too many rejected trips is a
“performance issue” that could result in termination. 317 There is
also evidence that Uber has attempted to control the “manner
and means” of the drivers’ services. 318 Drivers are instructed to
dress professionally, play soft jazz on the radio, and open the
door for riders. 319 Although Uber suggests that it merely provides
“suggestions” to its drivers, drivers are admonished for failing to
follow the suggestions. 320
One factor, whether the worker or employer supplies the
tools and instrumentalities, weighs in favor of a finding that the
drivers are independent contractors because the drivers pay for
See supra text accompanying notes 220–43.
Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information
Asymmetries: A Case Study of Uber’s Drivers, 10 INT’L J. OF COMMC’N 3758, 3762
312
313

(2016).
314
315
316
317
318
319
320

Id.
Id.

O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150.
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their gas, cars, and insurance. This factor, however, may become
of little relevance in a post-COVID society. The pandemic forced
a large share of the workforce to switch to remote, at-home
work. 321 As a result, many employees began to supply their own
work supplies, such as laptops, cell phones, and internet
connection. 322 Factors that initially weighed heavily in favor of
independent contractor status in a pre-Internet world, where it
was impossible to conduct work outside the office, simply do not
have the same level of probative value in 2022.
Uber further contends that its drivers are not employees
because they conduct work outside the company’s usual course of
business. 323 Uber argues that it is a technology platform, not a
transportation company. 324 Though a clever argument, it is one
that defies logic. Unsurprisingly, an English court rejected this
argument, explaining “the lady doth protest too much,” as it is
“unreal to deny that Uber is in business as a supplier of
transportation services.”325
IV.

CONCLUSION

Federal adoption of the ABC Test, either through statutory
amendments or judicial interpretation, would not put rideshare
drivers on equal footing with current employees. Even if the
federal government adopted the ABC Test, rideshare drivers
would not qualify for state unemployment insurance or state laws
321
Kathryn Vasel, The Pandemic Forced A Massive Remote-work Experiment.
Now Comes the Hard Part , CNN BUS. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/

2021/03/09/success/remote-work-covid-pandemic-one-year-later/index.html.
322
Kathleen McLeod Caminiti & Maxim Doroshenko, Covert Costs of the
COVID-19 Pandemic: Expense Reimbursement For Remote Workers , FISHER
PHILLIPS (May 30, 2020), https://www.fisherphillips.com/news-insights/covert-costsof-the-covid-19-pandemic-expense-reimbursement-for-remote-workers.html.
323
Joel Rosenblat, Uber’s Future May Depend On Convincing the World
Drivers Aren’t Part of its ‘Core Business ,’ TIME (Sept. 12, 2019), https://time.com/
5675637/uber-business-future/#:~:text=its%20'Core%20Business'-,Uber's%20
Future%20May%20Depend%20On%20Convincing%20the%20World%20Drivers%2
0Aren,Part%20of%20its%20'Core%20Business'&text=Facing%20the%20most%20se
rious,platform%2C%20not%20a%20transportation%20company.
324

Id.

Arjun Kharpal, Uber in Landmark UK Employment Tribunal: All You
Need To Know , CNBC (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/27/uber-uk325

employment-tribunal-drivers-rights-all-you-need-to-know.html.
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regarding sick time or workers’ compensation. 326 However, it is
certainly a step in the right direction toward expanding
protections and benefits to rideshare drivers. If the ABC Test
applied to all federal labor, employment, and tax laws, rideshare
drivers would, for the first time ever, be guaranteed a federal
minimum wage, have the ability to form and join unions, and
would be relieved of the heavy independent contractor tax
burden.
Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, and other rideshare companies have
successfully evaded new labor regulations at the state level. When
it seemed that California would finally require them to pay their
drivers a fair wage and expand basic employee benefits to the
drivers, the large companies managed to buy their way out of
classifying their drivers as employees.
Over the next couple of years, the Biden Administration will
be tasked with taking on these companies and ensuring workers
are paid a just wage. The gig economy will continue to grow over
the next several decades. The federal government must respond
to the changing employment landscape.

326
Sean Burke, Conflicting Interpretations of Worker Classification, THE
REGUL. REV. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/04/11/burkeinterpretations-worker-classification/.

